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RECENT CASE NOTES
that which he has actually done. He knows from the indictment the par-
ticular transaction it involves; he knows equally well just what part he
played therein; and he knows precisely what elements he must prepare to
go to trial on under the indictment. How, then, can there be surprise by
the introduction at the trial of those very facts which defendant has suffi-
cient knowledge of either through the indictment of his own acts? The
mere possibility of proving the requisite element of the lesser offense by an
act which would not sustain the necessary elements of the greater should
patently not control the legality 3f the conviction actually based on a find-
ing of an act that proves an element of both crimes-in one of which it is
necessary; in the other, not necessary, but nevertheless sufficient as an
alternative to another kind of act not essential for conviction of the greater.
And to set aside a conviction simply because of that possibility, if it never
materialized in the trial, would not be to conform to the purpose and prin-
ciple of the general rule; such a decision would hardly be colorable in the
light of the reason for the rule.
So the better rule would seem to be that where a defendant is charged
with one crime and convicted of a lesser, the elements of which do not
necessarily, but may, fall within the elements essential to the greater, and
where the facts developed at the trial do actually place the elements of the
particular crime that he is convicted of within the elements of the greater
crime charged, then a conviction of the lesser crime is lawful. For defen-
dant, by virtue of the notice contained in the indictment or charge, cannot
be surprised as to any element coming within the offense charged; there-
fore he cannot be surprised by proof of the very thing he did, if it is found
both in the elements of the greater crime and in his own proved conduct in
issue. Such a modification of the rule would give it a desirable degree of
flexibility, so that it would more nearly bear out its purpose, and the ends
of justice would thereby be more consistently attained.
H. W. J.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS-DEFENSE OF FRAUD-Suit in United States Dis-
trict Court N. D. Indiana on a judgment rendered in United States Dis-
trict Court N. D. Illinois, eastern division, on a cognovit note made by
defendant. Defense that note was obtained by fraud, and that an attor-
ney in fact confessed judgment, when an attorney of a court of record was
authorized to do so. Held, a good defense. Court not required under Art.
4, Sec. 1 of the Constitution to give effect to the foreign judgment because
the Illinois court had no jurisdiction to render a judgment obtained by
fraud. Also that attorney in fact could not confess judgment. Nardi V.
Poinsette, 46 Fed. (2nd) 347.
The principal case can be supported on the ground that the attorney
in fact had no power to confess judgment, Thomas v. Verden, 160 Fed. 418,
87 C. C. A. 370, Citizens Bank v. Brooks, 23 Fed. 21.
The other ground of the decision is more open to question.
It seems plausible to say that no court has jurisdiction to render a
judgment void because of fraud in obtaining the judgment and therefore
because of this lack of jurisdiction other states are not required to recog-
nize it under the full faith and credit clause, and will not recognize it as
a matter of conflict of laws. The courts have not, however, adopted this
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
position. Hanley v. Donogheu, 116 U. S. 1; Christmas v. Russel, 5 Wall. 290
and Maxwell v. Stewart, 21 Wall 71, apparently require that full faith and
credit be given to judgments of sister states where the court had jurisdic-
tion over the parties and the subject matter, even though they were
obtained by fraud. Other cases throw doubt on this position. United States
v. Throekmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93; Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing
-Scale Co., 261 U. S. 397, 67 L. Ed. 719, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458. As a result
of the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's position there is much confusion
among the state decisions. Freeman on Judgments, 661. Some cases flatly
repudiate this principle, as applied to jurisdiction obtained over the person
by fraud. Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260, 7 Am. Rep. 129 and note, 136.
The majority of the modern opinions allow the forum to give equitable relief
for certain types of fr.ud. United States v. Throckmorton, supra. And
in the code states, allow fraud in obtaining it to be plead as an equitable
defense to the judgment where there was an equitable remedy available in
the state where rendered. Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 482, 56 S. E. 371,
32 L. R. A. (NS) 904 and note; Joster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144, 49 L. Ed.
988. These courts allow collateral attack when the judgment could be set
aside where rendered (Ambler v. Whipple, 139 Ill. 311, but see Bell v.
Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 45 L. Ed. 804) either because service on defendant has
been obtained by fraudulent means (Abereronbie v. Abercronbie, 64 Kan.
29, 67 Pac. 539; Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N. E. 443) or because defen-
dant did not have an opportunity on account of fraud, to present proper
defense (Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Ia. 58), Art. 4, Sec. 1, not requiring a sister
state to give more credit to a judgment than it would receive at home.
Motter v. Davis, 65 S. W. 969. The great majority of courts refuse to
collaterally attack foreign judgments when the fraud consisted in the con-
duct of the litigation or the fabrication of the cause of action, since defen-
dant had a chance to properly defend himself. Muscatial v. Mo. A. R. Co.,
1 Dill (U. S.) 536; The Acorn Fed. Cases 29; Dathe v. Thomas, 109 Ill.
App. 434; Motter v. Davis, supra.
The question in the principal case is further complicated by the fact
that both were Federal cases.
Art. 4, Sec. 1 does not apply to Federal Courts. Supreme Lodge K. of
P. v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30, 68 L. Ed. 885. But there decisions are entitled
to full faith and credit as state decisions, as a conflict of laws rule. Sup.
Lodge K. of P. v. Meyey, supra; Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3. They are
to be treated as domestic judgments of the state where rendered. DuPas-
seur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Forutm, 176 U. S.
640, 44 L. Ed. 619. And where deciding local issues, they are to be con-
trolled by state law. Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545, 67 L. Ed. 396.
Both the Indiana and the Federal rule allow collateral attack on foreign
judgments void where rendered. Amary v. Amary, supra; Jones v. Britton
Fed. Case No. 7455; First National Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. 510;
Peninsular Iron Co. v. Bells, 68 Fed. 24, 15 C. C. A. 189, contra. English v.
Aldrich, 132 Ind. 500; Duringer v. Machinv, 93 Ind. 495. Complications
would arise if the state and Federal rule were different. In the cases
decided, the Federal Courts have ignored the state rule. Worthington v.
Ball, 90 Fed. 404, 33 C. C. A. 690; Rose v. N. W. Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
67 Fed. 439.
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The Federal Court of Indiana in looking to see whether the judgment
was void where rendered, meets the further complication of whether the
Illinois rule or Federal rule is to govern. Probably it would apply the
Federal rule as to the kind of fraud that would make the judgment void
where rendered. First National Bank v. Liewer, 187 Fed. 16; Penn. R. R.
v. Hummel, 167 Fed. 89.
The fraud that was practiced seems to have been in obtaining the note,
the judgment apparently being regular in form. In similar circumstances
both Illinois and the Federal courts have refused collateral attack. Mus-
cantine v. Mo. R. R. Co., 1 Dill (U. S.) 536; Whitcomb v. Schultz, 223 Fed.
268, 13 C. C. A. 510; Hollester v. Sobra, 264 Ill. 535, 106 N. E. 507.
J. S. G.
PLEADING-APPEAL AND ERROR-THEORY OF THE CAsE-The complaint
alleged that the appellAnt was negligent in maintaining its rails so that
they were higher than the street at a place where vehicles were supposed
to cross them at an angle; that while the appellee was attempting to cross
at that point with his auto the auto was held on the tracks; that while it
was so held the appellant, by its servants, with knowledge of the appellee's
dangerous position negligently ran its street car against appellee's auto
and injured the appellee without making any effort to stop or to check the
speed of the car and avoid the collision. The instructions given charged
the jury that there could be a recovery if it was found that the track was
negligently maintained as alleged and that such negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the appellee's injury. The jury was also instructed that,
if it found that the appellant operated its street car in the manner alleged
in the complaint and that the conduct of the appellant in this reward was
the proximate cause of the appellee's injuries, then the jury would be
justified in finding for the appellee. There was a verdict and judgment
for the appellee and the appellant appealed. Held, reversed, and a new
trial ordered. The complaint was drawn upon the theory that the alleged
injuries were caused by two dependent, concurring acts of negligence com-
mitted by the appellant, viz., the negligent maintenance of the crossing
and the negligent operation of the street car, the proof of both of which
is necessary to entitle the appellee to a recovery. The instructions were
erroneous in that they departed from the theory of the complaint and
should not have been given. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Win-
stead, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 25, 1931, 175 N. E. 281.
In the course of the opinion it was said, "That a complaint must pro-
ceed on some definite theory, which must be adhered to throughout the
trigl and upon appeal, is so thoroughly settled that the citation of authori-
ties is unnecessary." In a recent case note appearing in 6 Indiana Law
Journal 402 (March, 1931) it was sought to be shown that, in view of
sections 725 and 426 of Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes 1926 which
provide that cases shall not be reversed for defects in the pleadings or
where it appears that the case was fairly tried and determined upon the
merits, and in view of the recent decisions giving effect to these statutes,
it is doubtful whether or not the theory of the complaint is still law in
Indiana. Apparently these statutes and decisions were overlooked in the
principal case as no mention is therein made of them. These statutes were
